It contains a detailed description on the politics behind China's Research and Development sector: We "attempt to explain the details of China’s still unfolding indigenous innovation industrial policies while placing them in historical, political, social and economic context."
Some excerpts and summaries:
- China's plans for R&D are described in "The National Medium- and Long-Term Plan for the Development of Science and Technology (2006-2020)" (MLP)
- Re-innovation (what a nice word) is a must: "The report states: One should be clearly aware that the importation of technologies without emphasizing the assimilation, absorption and re-innovation is bound to weaken the nation’s indigenous research and development capacity.'"
- Why is R&D so important: "But the wide wealth gap between the cities and countryside, epidemic pollution, endemic corruption, several hundred protest demonstrations on any given day and an uncomfortable dependency on imported raw materials were just a few of the things that could keep the leaders awake at night. They heralded 'scientific development' as the elixir for China's structural problems and the main theme of their administration". (This also explains why you see the term "scientific" coming up over and over again, often in connotations that sound weird for Western readers)
- Bringing back talent is difficult: "The “100 Talents Program” of Chinese Academy of Science brought back 778 foreign scientists between 1998 and 2004, but fewer than half had doctorates and almostnone had tenured appointments abroad. Some top level scientists were lured back, but most of them kept positions in both places, maintaining foreign university tenure while taking advantage of Chinese government funding and facilities for research projects. China was simply unable to bring back top talent due to uncertainty about academic freedom, the ability to conduct quality research, and weak IPR protection."
- During the drafting of the MLP, conflicts arouse between those who favored peer review and smaller projects and those who preferred so-called "megaprojects". The conflicts were "solved" by censoring: "Overseas Chinese scientists appealed to senior leaders to avoid heading down the megaproject path. In the summer of 2004, a group of 11 ethnic Chinese scientists who were members of the Society of Chinese Bio-scientists in America wrote an open letter to Premier Wen saying that the big biology projects in the plan would stifle competition among scientists and hamper the prospects of genuine innovation. Nature magazine followed with a special Fall 2004 issue containing a collection of essays from prominent Chinese scientists, from inside and outside of China, which criticized the draft plan for giving bureaucrats too much power over scientists. Published in Chinese and English, the essays argued that the power to distribute research money should be taken away from MOST and funneled through peer review organizations. They argued that if megaprojects remained the central focus, money would be allocated to mediocre projects based on personal connections instead of pursuing real science. In one article, two US-based ethnic Chinese neuroscientists joined China’s senior life scientist from CAS to suggest that the power of MOST over research funding should be reduced, and perhaps the ministry should be disbanded altogether. When Chinese newspapers and magazines jumped into the debate, MOST and its supporters convinced the government’s General Administration of Press and Publications to ban distribution of the Nature supplement, and the Party propaganda department warned editors to drop the topic and avoid playing into the hands of “foreign forces”.
- Megaprojects prevailed: "The most ambitious components of the plan are 16 megaprojects. They are vehicles for an import substitution action plan aimed at creating Chinese indigenous innovations through “co-innovation” and “re-innovation” of foreign technologies supplied by companies seeking to profit from the massive government outlays on the megaprojects."
- And measures were taken to make sure they were taken seriously: "To ensure that the megaproject plans didn’t get lost in the Chinese bureaucracy, Party leaders assigned responsibility for the 99 supporting policies to ministers, vice-ministers and other senior officials by name and with deadlines attached... This unprecedented high-level hands-on micromanagement demonstrates that the indigenous innovation program is the government’s highest strategic economic priority. But it also should remind international government leaders and foreign technology company executives that the same ministers they meet in Beijing for friendly trade talks are also directing plans for creating Chinese technologies and companies to replace them."
- Big winners are selected by the government, actual R&D doesn't matter so much: "Many SOEs [State-Owned Enterprises] are flush with cash, especially several dozen largest SOEs that have been chosen to become national champions and currently enjoy monopolies or controlled competition. When the plan was unveiled in 2006, the Party mouthpiece People’s Daily complained that SOEs “are not taking research and development seriously” and noted that some 75 percent of SOEs didn’t even employ a single R&D staffer."
- Protectionism via regulations: "With the government controlling standards, certification and testing regimes can be formidable tools for protectionism. Under the indigenous innovation campaign many restrictions, requirements and constantly changing standards have been coming out of China’s national and local regulators. A key piece of this is the Chinese Compulsory Certification system which issues the “CCC Mark” of safety approval for China’s tech and industrial products. The CCC system is estimated to affect some 20 percent of US exports to China. In almost all cases, the products are already approved by qualified international organizations. But China requires redundant testing by Chinese government-owned labs and recertification, which often starts with the foreign manufacturers paying international travel expenses for Chinese inspectors to visit their factories. Incredibly detailed requirements often delay foreign products as Chinese competitors capture the market. For example, cosmetics companies must submit each new shade of lipstick or nail polish for months of separate testing and certification."
- How to encourage patents: "Patent filing is part of SASAC’s [State-Owned Assets and Supervision Management Commission] performance evaluation for SOEs. Local governments provide instant profits for companies by giving subsidies to pay for patent filing costs that often exceed budgeted costs."
- And in consequence: "So nearly three-quarters of Chinese patent filings were in the “junk”category."
- Re-innovation can be successful: "In 2004, foreign wind turbines had a 75 percent market share in China. By 2009, the three largest domestic players, Sinovel, Goldwind and Dongfang alone had 60 percent of the market -- and the foreign share was down to 14 percent."
- Distrust of Chinese scholars trained in the West: "Chinese scientists with many years overseas are sometimes viewed as a threat by less-experienced but influential government scientists as well as by the MOST and NDRC bureaucrats who want full control of the scientific projects that they fund."
Interesting view behind the scenes. I don't have to personal experience to judge whether everything is correct (and keep in mind the report was written for the Chamber of Commerce), but those parts related to research feel right.
